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Everybody is talking about artificial intelligence (AI) and the subject is considered one of the central 
issues of the future, because it is foreseeable that the power of AI systems will enable extraordinary 
advances in a wide variety of applications – resource optimization, forecasting, object recognition, 
human-computer interaction or controlling robot-based systems. This is even more the case when AI 
possesses the capacity for so-called “machine learning”, i.e., the ability to develop its own rules on 
the basis of observations or provided data. This capability allows unprecedented independence from 
the capability of human programmers to anticipate events.
In armaments, these developments are already playing an important role: Conventional AI is al-
ready being used in combat aircraft, drones, gun turrets or humanoid robots as a control and as-
sistance unit, for example in navigation and target recognition. Machine learning-powered Artificial 
Intelligence (MLpAI) is currently being tested in the development of new weapon systems or integrat-
ed into prototypes.
These trends make artificial intelligence an important issue in arms control, and in two respects. 
As the object of arms control, MLpAI lies outside traditional approaches because it has neither the 
physical qualities or abilities nor the transparent operations that current methods and procedures for 
both quantitative and qualitative arms limitation are based on. On the other hand, MLpAI provides 
new tools for arms control. Thus, it is conceivable that the verification of existing and new arms 
control contracts, i.e., verification of compliance with them, could benefit significantly from MLpAI 
as a technical tool, for example by increasing the precision and speed of collecting, processing and 
analyzing data.
From a security policy perspective, MLpAI thus offers risks and opportunities alike, and the fore-
seeable increase in the use of machine learning will increase these risks and opportunities to a very 
considerable degree. The risk is that MLpAI, as the core element of future autonomous weapons 
systems, must be limited by arms control, but that at the same time arms control does not possess 
adequate technical capabilities. At this point, traditional approaches have been exhausted and the 
possibility of monitoring and limiting MLpAI during development or deployment remain. If MLpAI is 
used unchecked, it jeopardizes strategic stability by minimizing the de-escalating human factor, pro-
moting a technological arms race, and spreading uncontrollably. This is countered by the enormous 
potential inherent in MLpAI for the verification of arms control agreements. The identification of ob-
jects, phenomena and changes over time on satellite imagery, on video recordings or in data from 
electromagnetic, seismic or acoustic sensors is demonstrably improved by the use of machine learn-
ing. Far more accurate and comprehensive information processing could increase transparency, dis-
courage actors from violating agreements or be used as evidence of compliance with agreements.
The report concludes that MLpAI is both part of the problem and part of the solution. Current and 
future application examples show that MLpAI is the core element of modern weapons systems and 
thus should itself be the subject of arms control – especially given that the capabilities, but also the 
dangers, of the weapons systems would be greatly increased by MLpAI. However, as an object of 
control it eludes many approaches to qualitative or quantitative limitation. Thus, it increases the rele-
vance of alternative methods for overall military transparency and confidence-building. It is precisely 
Summary
in these methods, however, that it can be used as a verification instrument. Through precise and ex-
tensive information processing it can create greater transparency and verify compliance with agree-
ments, thus bolstering trust between parties. The developments in the two possible areas where 
MLpAI can be deployed and the lower technical complexity in verification measures show that early 
action can support the potential benefits of MLpAI, because it can now help arms control develop 
new capacity before it faces the new challenge of MLpAI-controlled weapons systems.
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1. IntroduCtIon
The application of artificial intelligence (AI) in weapons systems without external monitoring or con-
trols poses a risk to humanity that is increasing with the growing capability of the technology. The 
risk is most obvious when AI is intentionally applied for destructive purposes or when it chooses 
such a path on its own initiative, in order to achieve a given goal. On the other hand, the develop-
ment of AI also offers positive opportunities for humanity. The extraordinary power of AI to process 
information enables it to recognize and interpret patterns in seemingly unstructured datasets, solve 
problems based on pre-specified or acquired knowledge, plan measures, or draw conclusions. In 
practice, AI is used in areas such as optimizing the use of resources, forecasting developments over 
time, recognizing objects in recorded images, communicating with humans or controlling robotic 
systems. The tension between risks and opportunities in the use of AI is thus the basic issue exam-
ined in this report.
The ambivalence between positive and negative consequences of the implementation of AI is 
also found in arms control: The overarching objective of arms control is to “create a greater measure 
of strategic stability between two or more states” and thus “reduce the likelihood of war breaking out 
at a time of crisis” (Croft 1996: 91–92). For this purpose, arms control measures “(a) freeze, limit, 
reduce or abolish certain categories of weapons; (b) ban the testing of certain weapons; (c) prevent 
certain military activities; (d) regulate the deployment of armed forces” (Goldblat 2002: 3).
As with any innovations in weapons technologies, governments seek to use technology in weap-
ons systems to gain or offset technological superiority and thus obtain a strategic advantage over 
other states. Consequently, if the use of AI in weapons systems were regulated in order to improve 
strategic stability, this would be a new challenge for arms control. As an object of control, AI would be 
part of a lineup including mines, ammunition, small arms, conventional weapons, weapons of mass 
destruction and delivery systems. However, these are physical objects that are regulated by tech-
nical, geographical or application-related characteristics. If this is also to be done with AI, inherent 
properties of AI must be identified that make restriction and monitoring possible. On the other hand, 
if AI is not regulated, previously unheard-of consequences for strategic stability may arise.
This threat to stability is emerging at a time when arms control is already in crisis due to mili-
tary-technical progress, breaches of treaties and lack of political will (Arbatov 2015; Schmidt 2017). 
But at the same time, AI provides new opportunities for controlling conventional weapons and weap-
ons of mass destruction and can help verify compliance with existing and new arms control treaties. 
In order to increase confidence in control treaties and among states, off-site and on-site inspections 
create transparency and help to monitor states’ performance. For this purpose, technical aids are 
usually deployed to collect, process and analyze information (Goldblat 2002: 310). The potential of 
verification measures has increased with new technologies as satellites, sensors and other monitor-
ing techniques improve the information situation (Pilat 2002: 81). At this point AI can serve as a mul-
tiplier because it can analyze this information – especially large data sets – with greater precision 
and at higher speed than conventional methods.
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This report first discusses the research object “Machine Learning-powered Artificial Intelligence” 
(MLpAI) and current challenges in developing the ability to learn. It then explores the question of the 
threats arising from application of MLpAI in weapons systems (Chapter 3) and where it opens up 
new opportunities for arms control and verification (Chapter 4). The report concludes that MLpAI in 
weapons systems can avoid control by many traditional arms control approaches, and at the same 
time can increase fundamental transparency and reinforce trust among parties to verification mea-
sures (Chapter 5).
2. maChIne LearnIng-powered artIfICIaL InteLLIgenCe
When an attempt is made to answer the question of what is meant by “AI” it must be admitted that 
there are many approaches to the issue, but no universally accepted definition. “There are about as 
many definitions of AI as researchers developing the technology” (McCloskey 2017).
But most definitions agree on two core characteristics: 1) solving highly complex tasks and 
2) adapting to the environment.1 AI systems that perform especially well in these two core areas 
mostly display the ability to learn. This feature stands out among the recognized abilities of AI – 
perception, knowledge representation, problem solving, planning and reasoning. This is supported 
by the still ongoing increases in performance of hardware, especially the computing power of the 
processors, and the availability of large data sets as a learning tool.
In the past, computer programs could interpret only matters for which the programmer had spec-
ified rules, in other words, conditional “if-then” relationships. When future situations or changes over 
time cannot be anticipated by the human programmer, or if the programmers themselves do not know 
the solution, then the use of machine learning helps (Russell/Norvig 2010: 693). This refers to sys-
tems that generate their own knowledge by extracting patterns from raw data. With this innovation, AI 
can solve complex real-world problems without having to rely on solutions specified by programmers 
(Goodfellow 2016: 3). The focus of this report will be on such machine learning-powered artificial 
intelligence (MLpAI), because the ability to learn is a prerequisite for outstanding achievements in 
the two core properties of AI mentioned above – the ability to solve complex tasks and adaptability.
In addition to its deliberate focus on specific learning ability, this report also restricts the aspects 
of AI to be examined according to their general goal: Is the goal a generally intelligent machine or a 
machine that is considered “intelligent” only in a specific discipline? Essentially, every definition can 
be classified according to this division. Although the vision of a generally intelligent machine arous-
es public interest, there is no system yet that satisfies this requirement. Since experts estimate the 
development time for so-called Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) to be at least 50 years (Müller/
Bostrom 2016: 559), such a definition is not a practical starting point for analyzing current and  recent 
applications. Instead, in this report exclusively examples of AI will be examined which are being 
1   A summary of definitions of AI can be found in Artificial General Intelligence Sentinel Initiative (2017); Legg/Hutter 
(2007).
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developed or optimized for a specific discipline or task. For this already existing type of AI human 
beings do not serve as a model, but at the most as a performance criterion. The goal of “applica-
tion-specific” AI – also referred to as “narrow AI” (Franklin 2014: 16) or “weak AI” (Searle 1980: 417) – 
is to achieve worthwhile results or “intelligent” performance in at least a single discipline.
By focusing on application-specific machine learning-powered artificial intelligence, the review of 
empirical findings in this report focuses primarily on new, innovative AI programs and excludes both 
traditional computer programs and futuristic AI concepts. This report makes a deliberate distinction 
between “AI” and “MLpAI”. Where the term “AI” is referred to on its own, then either the statements 
are also valid for AI without learning capability or the functioning of an empirical example cannot be 
attributed with certainty to the ability to learn.
2.1 DRIVER OF THE AI REVOLUTION: MACHINE LEARNING
Many human or animal actions are highly complex for computers. The processing of speech or im-
ages and subsequent coordination of actions is so complex that human beings themselves do not 
understand it sufficiently to be able to transfer it to a program. In order for these highly complex tasks 
to be mastered by AI, it is given the ability to learn. MLpAI recognizes solution patterns and transfers 
them to other tasks. This is also necessary because tasks may change depending on the time, the 
user or other parameters (Shalev-Shwartz/Ben-David 2014: 21–22).
Two forms of MLpAI can be distinguished: AI can learn purely on the basis of pre-determined data 
(unsupervised) or with the help of additional inputs from a teacher (supervised or reinforced).
Unsupervised learning occurs when machine learning builds clusters from unknown data. 
 Machine learning independently identifies characteristics that involve similarities and differences. 
For example, it recognizes that satellite images can be grouped according to visible land, sea or 
clouds. In the case of supervised or reinforced learning, on the other hand, the relevant character-
istics of the data are pre-defined. This approach allows classification (e.g., mapping subjects into 
images), regression (e.g., prediction of environmental phenomena), or detection of anomalies (e.g., 
detection of unnatural eruptions) within the data (Russell/Norvig 2010: 694–697).
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Fig. 1: Classification (top left), cluster building (top right), regression (bottom left), recognition of 
anomalies (bottom right). Author’s own depiction.
Machine learning can involve numerous methods such as naive Bayesian algorithms, support vector 
machine algorithms2 or different variants of decision trees. However, the current method of deep 
learning (also known as the deep neural network method) accounts for most of the progress made 
in AI research recently. Its high level of adaptability and performance in highly complex tasks is 
based on its orientation to the human brain by copying neural networks. But so far it has not even 
2   These methods are based on mathematical methods that maximize different variables in functions in order to clas-
sify objects, for example, to maximize the difference between objects or achieve the lowest classification costs for a 
predefined measure. 
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approached the complexity of the human brain (Hawkins/Blakeslee 2004: 25–27). However, the im-
provements achieved in performance in specific applications such as image recognition are already 
substantial. While conventional programs are unable to extract meaning from a collection of different 
pixels of an image, the deep learning method divides the process into many sub-steps. The first level 
(“1st hidden layer”) compares the brightness of the pixels, in order to identify edges in the image. The 
second level searches for corners and contours based on the results of the first level. The third level, 
in turn, can then identify entire parts of specific objects (e.g., nose, ears, legs) by finding specific sub-
groupings of corners and contours. Finally, the computer is able to interpret the image on the basis 
of the various objects detected (Goodfellow 2016: 6). 
This process can only be performed after the computer has previously learned which objects an 
image includes, for example, a car, a person, or an animal. In the learning process, the “output layer” 
is specified in advance and the levels are processed in reverse order. Machine learning associates 
the objects detected at the third level with the given result, the contours of the second level with the 
objects, and the brightness of the pixels of the first level with the contours.3 It is extremely important 
to understand that the results at which the deep learning program arrives only reflect probabilities. It 
does not decide on a particular option and justify it, but, for example, states that it is 9% likely to be a 
car, 72% a person or 19% an animal. How these outputs are applied is up to the programmer.
Because machines understand only the formalized interdependencies of variables and not their 
content, machine learning is called “automated statistics” by some scientists and critics (Danks 2014: 
159f). However, the learning models themselves and the parent program are based on a rule-based 
system. Thus – in contrast to statistics – they always contain conscious or unconscious normative 
ideas, which are introduced by the programmers via decisions in the program code or the selection 
of learning data (Algorithm Watch 2017: 3).
It should be noted that the potential of machine learning is far from exhausted. Numerous meth-
ods covered by the term have already been and are still being developed (Farrelly 2016). In addition 
to increased complexity, future milestones are expected in the following areas: continued learning 
beyond a limited set of input data, transfer of acquired knowledge to other tasks, independent gener-
ation of input data (Morisse 2017) and learning by observing other machines (Li et al. 2016).
2.2 CHALLENGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND USE OF MACHINE LEARNING
If machine learning is to be used in real applications, three challenges must be overcome: (1) errors 
or inaccuracies in the system or learning process, (2) difficult explainability4 of decisions in the ab-
sence of appropriate precautions, and (3) manipulability of results by means of deliberately biased 
input data.
3   A more detailed explanation and excellent visualization of the process can be found in Zeiler and Fergus (2013).
4   The degree to which learned models and decisions can be understood and trusted by users.
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The first challenge for machine learning presented here is to strike a balance between two fac-
tors, namely, on the one hand, the complexity of the learned model, which becomes more complex 
with increasing precision, and, on the other hand, the generalizability of the learned model to new 
data (Danks 2014: 155f). The interaction between these factors poses a dilemma: If the model be-
comes too complex and exactly maps the training data – i.e., the data which is supposed to describe 
reality – then the model can no longer generalize, so it cannot be applied to new, previously unknown 
data (overmatching). If the model maps the training data too inaccurate, then it can be generalized, 
but reality is not correctly modeled (undermatching). As a result, generalization is vulnerable to incor-
rect conclusions. Harmful feedback loops can occur in which machine learning designs a logic of its 
own, from which it cannot escape without corrective feedback. These generalization errors are not 
always detected in practical situations and may thus be adopted in real-life applications. The actors 
who depend on this incorrect model of AI must follow the rules established by the AI to succeed. 
This, in turn, distorts possible feedback to the system. This problem can be seen for example in the 
prediction of criminal offenses: Police officers patrol separately in districts that the system rates as 
particularly critical at the current time of day. Because of the increased police presence more offens-
es are detected. The prediction made by the system is confirmed and at the same time the incidents 
that are logged are included in the data base for further predictions. Such feedback loops have also 
been detected in facial recognition, teacher assessment, and granting of credit and insurance cover-
age (O’Neil 2016).
As a second challenge, it is particularly noteworthy that machine learning, especially deep learn-
ing has been described by many researchers as a “black box,” because of its inherent characteris-
tics (Knight 2017; Ribeiro et al. 2016). Given that in their entirety autonomously learned rules are a 
mathematical model based on thousands or even millions of parameters, a decision path in complex 
models involving, for example, the assignment of a small section of an image to a category, cannot 
be logically understood by a human
Even the developers cannot always understand how machine learning arrives at its decision. In 
many cases this uncertainty is accepted or simply left up to the system. But with increasing appli-
cation of the method of deep learning this becomes an increasing risk. Although other methods 
are more explainable, explainability correlates negatively with accuracy. For example, if a program 
learns by using a decision tree with binary branches, the results are transparent, but not as accurate 
as through the simultaneous, percentage weighting of several features at hundreds of abstraction 
levels provided by a deep learning model (Gunning 2016: 4). In the case of deep learning systems, an 
attempt is made to increase explainability by not only specifying the probability of a particular option, 
but also giving a justification of why this option is the most probable. For example, instead of the out-
put, “the object is 93% likely to be a cat,” the machine learning algorithm should specify: “The object 
is 93% likely to be a cat, because it has fur, paws and claws”. Research on linking pattern recognition 
and verbal description of the pattern shows that additional machine learning applications can make 
such explanations possible (Park et al. 2017). Although some approaches may sound promising, this 
branch of research5 is still new and restricted in scope, at least in terms of what is publicly known. 
5   This research is referred to as “explainable artificial intelligence.”
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By contrast, US military research has dedicated a program area of its own to explainable machine 
learning (Gunning 2016).
The third challenge became visible as a result of the insights of a research team from Google, 
Facebook and various universities. The team found that the image recognition of the deep learning 
method had an unexpectedly high error rate and contained errors of classification if information that 
is not visible to the human eye had been added to the image (Szegedy et al. 2014). These results 
lead to two fundamental findings: First, even machine learning with outstanding performance capa-
bility fails to learn the correct concept underlying the images. Instead, it constructs a model based 
on statistical relationships that incorporates naturally occurring data, it is true, but has fundamental 
 weaknesses when confronted with a very unnatural or unlikely data distribution (Goodfellow et al. 
2015: 2). Secondly, the possibility of manipulating machine learning via input data creates a major 
gap in security. Without a solution there is a constant risk that the data the AI analyzes has been de-
liberately altered in such a way that the system misinterprets it. In addition, scientists have been able 
to show that a conflicting image (adversarial example6) retains its manipulative properties even when 
it is printed and re-photographed with any camera. For example, a picture of a washing machine may 
look like a safe to the algorithm (Kurakin et al. 2017). In another study it was shown that facial recog-
nition systems could be influenced with special glasses in such a way that the people photographed 
were identified as other people in the database. The authors warn that such methods could be used 
in future in criminal files (Sharif et al. 2016). This optical illusion for machines bears enormous risks 
for practical applications of machine learning. If attackers wanted to manipulate a self-driving car, 
they could alter street signs in such a way that the machine learning algorithm, which recognizes 
and interprets traffic signs, would interpret a sign as a right-of-way signal instead of a stop sign. 
That this is not just a hypothetical scenario was proved by Nicolas Papernot and his colleagues, who 
reconstructed the scenario just described (Papernot et al. 2017). These cases make it clear that ma-
nipulations are possible not only by changes to the data file, but also through purely visual changes, 
as objects in the real world can be manipulated too. In addition, the learning models involved in rec-
ognition of the washing machine, faces, and traffic signs were correctly trained, but the application 
data – i.e., the data to be analyzed – was manipulated.
3.  maChIne LearnIng-powered artIfICIaL InteLLIgenCe In 
weaponS SyStemS
Under the aegis of the UN, a debate on the prohibition of deadly autonomous weapons systems is 
currently taking place in Geneva (Boulanin/Verbruggen 2017). In civil society, calls for the banning 
of autonomous weapons systems are being supported by prominent scientists and organizations 
( Sauer 2016; Future of Life Institute 2015; Human Rights Watch 2012). While these debates and 
calls also address the use of AI in weapons systems, they focus on the issue of autonomy. As will be 
shown in this chapter, as a property of AI-controlled systems autonomy is not a suitable approach for 
arms control. Since other approaches of traditional arms control (physical characteristics or capa-
6   An adversarial example is input data intentionally designed to cause the system to crash or make a mistake.
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bilities as well as internal functioning) do not provide reliable evidence in the case of AI, alternative 
control methods focused on development and deployment are considered. Considering the potential 
use of AI in weapons systems, destabilizing consequences such as accelerated processes, lack of 
de-escalating action, a technological arms race or uncontrolled proliferation are discussed.
3.1  AI AS A CORE ELEMENT OF MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND LEARNING ABILITY 
AS A MULTIPLIER
As with conventional computers, weapons systems also distinguish between hardware and software. 
This distinction is reflected in the terms “robotics” and “AI.” Developments in robotics are improving 
the physical capability and firepower of weapons systems, but their potential for improvement is lim-
ited by restrictions deriving from the laws of physics. The development of MLpAI, on the other hand, 
multiplies the software-related capabilities of weapons systems many times over, because only 
 MLpAI can increasingly improve the ability of weapon systems to operate in complex environments.
Even if no general definition of autonomous weapons systems yet exists, application-specific AI 
is already to be found in weapons systems as a control or assistance unit. The ability to learn cannot 
be inferred with certainty in the following examples, but – depending on the system – AI is used for 
navigation, target recognition and identification, as well as in attack planning and execution. Many 
applications are located in digital space, in airspace, and in static defense systems, because the 
environment in which AI must operate in these applications is less complex than in ground or urban 
warfare. The environment increases in complexity as the number of (unknown) challenges increases: 
e.g., navigation on uneven ground, obstacles of all kinds and interactions with unfamiliar objects.
As a support system for fighter pilots, AI is trained, for example, to recognize targets based on ra-
dar images in order to avoid misjudgments by the pilot, or to make a decision to fire from a great dis-
tance significantly beyond the visual range of the pilot (Keller 2015). AI takes over further tasks in the 
drone Taranis, which British manufacturer BAE Systems is currently developing. In addition to manual 
remote control and automatic flight navigation, Taranis has a mode in which it autonomously plans 
a route and searches for targets until it reaches its mission target (Stevenson 2016). The AI ALPHA, 
which has not yet been installed in drones, has the capability to take command of the entire flight and 
battle maneuvers – until recently still the exclusive domain of human pilots: In a simulation opposing 
the experienced Colonel of the US Air Force, Gene Lee, the system demonstrated outstanding capa-
bility, simultaneously dodging missiles fired at it, firing at several targets, participating in coordinated 
maneuvers, and registering and learning from enemy tactics. The colonel labelled the MLpAI, which 
ran on a computer costing only $US35.00, a Raspberry Pi, as “the most aggressive, responsive, dy-
namic and credible AI I’ve seen to date” (Ernest et al. 2016).
In addition, some static defense systems – small turrets or anti-aircraft guns – are among the 
first AI-controlled weapons systems, because they do not encounter complex environmental chal-
lenges. The Super Aegis II gun turret is designed to independently identify, target, track and  ultimately 
fire upon targets without human help. Due to the fear of customers that the system could make 
mistakes in autonomous mode, the degree of autonomy can now be set individually (Parkin 2015). 
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The US Navy’s Phalanx CIWS anti-aircraft cannon can also carry out these actions autonomously to 
defend itself against incoming missiles and aircraft (US Navy 2017).
The areas of application are constantly being expanded and autonomous nanodrones (Daniels 
2017), warships (Courtland 2016), and humanoid robots (Boston Dynamics 2018) are already under 
development. However, development is not focused exclusively on individual systems, but also on 
a new form of interaction. In the future, weapons systems will also be able to operate in a swarm. A 
swarm consists of many individual machines that can act independently, but also in concert. They 
 coordinate themselves based on uninterrupted communication among units (Ben-Ari/Mondada 
2018: 251–252). This has the advantage, among other things, that there is no central control unit that 
can fail, so that individual defects or kills have only a small effect on the performance of the swarm. 
AI would thus not only lead to the technical superiority of individual systems but would also optimize 
the deployment of entire battle units.
No operational weapons system which uses the ability of machine learning is yet known. The 
 ALPHA AI just described for controlling a fighter jet and the announcement by the Russian arms 
supplier Kalashnikov that it is utilizing learning capability (Russia Today 2017) seem to show that 
AI capable of learning is being integrated into new weapons systems. Although its operation is un-
known due to military secrecy, private-sector research projects indicate how MLpAI could be used 
in weapons systems. A research team from chipmaker Nvidia, which actually develops highly spe-
cialized graphics chips, trained MLpAI to drive a car without dictating any rules. As input data, the 
MLpAI only received the movements of the steering wheel and camera footage from the front of 
the car. Despite this limited perception, the MLpAI learned the rules of road traffic in the course of 
 human-controlled journeys and was subsequently able to drive on its own (Bojarski et al. 2016). This 
differs greatly from conventional autonomous driving systems, which are given the interpretation of 
traffic rules and vehicle behavior in advance. The learned driving style has the obvious disadvantage 
that human errors are acquired as well. However, it also has great advantages because the program 
learns intuitive rules about which the driver is not consciously aware and is also trained to deal 
with unanticipated situations. Accordingly, in an analogous way, mobile weapon systems could ac-
quire the ability to navigate through supervised learning. Targeted recognition and identification can 
also be significantly refined through machine learning by using the typical skills of the deep learning 
method – perception and classification of objects. In (combat) situations AI has to decide and act 
appropriately. The necessary inference and planning skills can be trained by using simulations that 
are monitored by humans. Thus, machine learning can improve the performance of all the skills an 
AI needs in weapon systems.
3.2 CHARACTERISTICS MAKING CONTROL DIFFICULT AND NEW APPROACHES
If AI is indeed the core element of autonomous weapons systems and learning capability is further en-
hancing the capabilities of these systems without the need for adaptation of hardware, then it can be con-
cluded that ultimately the focus of arms control should not be on autonomy, but on  weapon-controlling 
MLpAI. But, as will now be shown, MLpAI leads to completely new problems for arms control.
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3.2.1 InterChangeabLe exterIorS through InCreaSed hardware CompatIbILIty
As discussed in chapter 3.1, the processes of development of hardware and software can be con-
sidered separately. However, since the interaction of the two levels must be coordinated in practical 
applications, it is not possible to achieve general interchangeability of hardware. The software must 
be able to communicate with the hardware. One way to increase compatibility with a large variety 
of hardware components is to have consistent standards and automatic driver updates. For more 
complex hardware systems, so-called “middleware” is used in robotics. The middleware governs the 
heterogeneity of hardware and applications through an additional layer. It facilitates the integration of 
new technologies, the use of sensor data and the interchangeability of components. The integration 
of machine learning can further increase the compatibility of middleware by allowing it to dynam-
ically adapt to the system (Bennaceur et al. 2013). If such methods are also used in the develop-
ment of weapons systems, MLpAI could be used in different systems without complex adjustments. 
 MLpAI could equally well control a drone, an underwater vehicle, a rocket, or other robotic weapons. 
Thus, the element of new weapons technologies cannot be associated exclusively with any specific 
 weapons system.
A common approach of arms control is the quantitative limitation of a weapon’s carrier system. 
If MLpAI is understood as a weapon or its multiplier, conventionally armed drones, robots, etc. rep-
resent the carrier systems. However, limiting the carrier system would merely cause the transfer of 
the MLpAI to another system. Navigation, target identification, and action could take place on all 
systems by means of a similar setup, thus providing the compatibility required for transfer. Thus, as 
a destructive core element of weapons systems MLpAI cannot be identified through an externally 
visible system, which thus eliminates one of the usual approaches to arms control.
3.2.2  exChangeabILIty of externaLLy vISIbLe CapabILItIeS through 
Software updateS and open Software arChIteCture
A typical feature of computer programs are updates, which are intended to close security holes, 
add features, or modify components. With the increasing use of software-based weapons systems, 
updates are also necessary here. Highly engineered fighter aircraft exemplify this: The US Air Force 
updated the software of the F-22 fighter aircraft in order to make it capable of firing newer weapons, 
identifying targets better, and thus performing a wider range of assault missions (Osborn 2017). In 
addition, weapon systems that use MLpAI can be equipped with additional functions without chang-
ing the hardware. To further increase the flexibility of this process, open software architecture can be 
introduced. Such architecture can be found in smartphones: So-called “apps” are applications that 
allow the system to add, remove or update components without changing the main program. In the 
armaments industry, this system is already being used in the F-35 fighter jet. The Israeli military im-
ports this aircraft and, using open architecture, can adapt it to its own requirements without changing 
the central software (Adams 2016). Other US defense companies are also developing open software 
architecture for their own products. If a group-wide standard were established, applications could be 
used flexibly, regardless of the type and design of the weapons system (Hagen et al. 2012: 6).
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One approach to arms control is to limit the capabilities of weapons. The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 
once in force, prohibits nuclear explosions for civilian or military purposes. In this case, arms control 
relies on the explosive power of nuclear weapons. However, MLpAI functions can be flexibly added to 
or removed from weapons systems. Identification and restriction of weapons systems are not possi-
ble on the basis of visible capabilities. Even during inspections, critical functions could be added or 
removed for a short time.
3.2.3  IntranSparent InternaL mode of operatIon through CompLex reverSe 
engIneerIng and LaCk of expLaInabILIty of the LearnIng modeL
If an agreement on the functioning of a computer program is to be verified, the source code of the 
program can be analyzed. If only the completed system is available, for example, an autonomous 
drone, the source code cannot be easily extracted. Programs are typically written in a so-called high-
er-level language, which is usually converted into machine language by a compiler.7 This transforma-
tion destroys meta-information, making it difficult to reverse the process. Special programs can be 
used to reconstruct the source code through so called reverseengineering (Eilam 2005). Neverthe-
less, an initial hurdle to control and verification of digitally controlled weapons systems is created 
solely by the basic architecture of software. This already applies to today’s weapons systems, even 
without machine learning.
In machine-learning applications, however, a second level of intransparency is added. As de-
scribed in chapter 2.2, inherent characteristics of the different learning methods determine its trans-
parency. Until now, scarcely-explored methods would need to be added to the weapons system to 
justify its capabilities. Apart from after-the-fact clarification, prior determination of capabilities is 
impossible as long as the model learned is not visible.
Another common approach for arms control is the mode of operation of, for example, nuclear 
weapons, anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions. In the case of nuclear weapons, the use of 
nuclear energy for an explosion is controlled. Anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions are 
prohibited, as their mode of operation cannot distinguish between combatants and civilians. In the 
case of MLpAI, the mode of operation is made intransparent by the two levels already described. This 
lack of transparency eliminates a further approach of arms control, since MLpAI in weapons systems 
cannot be defined and restricted on the basis of the mode of operation.
3.2.4 teChnICaL approaCheS that enabLe armS ControL
If – as concluded in previous chapters – the existence, hardware, mode of operation, and capabilities 
of MLpAI do not provide a reliable approach that allows arms control to be carried out – then this 
7   Higher-level language can also be interpreted in real time. Direct interpretation makes testing and modifying of the 
code easier. Nonetheless, compiling is still customary, as it increases the efficiency of the code.
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must be achieved by implementing control measures on arms development or deployment. Develop-
ment as an approach is addressed by the concept of preventive arms control. In this approach, mili-
tarily applicable technologies, substances or systems are identified and banned or regulated during 
the development or testing phase (Altmann 2008):
“In concrete terms, preventive arms control aims at limiting, suspending, or terminating 
related research and development processes and/or prohibiting military options based on 
their implementation in weapons (systems).” (Neuneck/Mutz 2000: 109)
In this context, a register for military research and development, which would detect armament risks 
at an early stage, is conceivable (Müller 2000). But this approach requires a high degree of transpar-
ency in the development process, which could then be copied by other parties far more easily than 
current technologies. In addition, the overlap with civilian AI research makes it difficult to clearly clar-
ify intentions (Bostrom 2017).
The application of AI in weapons systems could be achieved by restricting the strategic and tac-
tical goals of the system and the associated options for use (Kahl/Mölling 2005: 350). Such mission 
objectives and the actions of the system could be recorded in a kind of black box. A “glass box”, as 
proposed by Gubrud and Altmann, could increase transparency immensely:
“A time slice of the data stream immediately prior to and including the selection and en-
gagement commands could be designated as the primary record of the engagement. This 
record would be held by the state party, but a cryptographic code called a ‘hash’ of the re-
cord would be recorded by a ‘glass box’ […] together with a time stamp of the moment the 
engagement command was issued. The hash would serve as a digital seal of the engage-
ment record; if even a single bit of the record were later altered, the hash would not match.” 
(Gubrud/Altmann 2013: 6)
In the event of suspicion of illegal acts of war, the state would have to hand over the recorded data 
from the box to an international verification authority.
3.3 CONCEPTUAL REFLECTION: STRATEGIC INSTABILITY AND PROLIFERATION
After identifying the relevance and hurdles associated with MLpAI as an object of control, this chap-
ter will apply arms control theory to working out the consequences of the use of MLpAI. The goal 
of stabilizing inter-state relations is to be achieved by preventing military escalation and an arms 
race. But humans’ options for achieving de-escalation by means of arms control would vanish with 
the autonomy of weapons systems. In addition, MLpAI could contribute to vertical proliferation – 
further military-technological development and improvement of existing capacities – and thus to 
a new arms race. In addition, MLpAI development can be used equally well for civilian and military 
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purposes, and thus contribute to horizontal proliferation – dissemination of military-technological 
knowledge and weapons systems among state and non-state actors.
3.3.1 CrISIS InStabILIty: LaCk of de-eSCaLatIng human nature
Using MLpAI with sophisticated perceptual, learning, and inference skills in weapons systems can 
result in a high degree of autonomy. This endangers the overall armaments policy goal of crisis stabil-
ity, since the moderating factor constituted by human beings is minimized. The essence of this factor 
is that human beings slow things down:
“Despite modern communications and electronic data processing, officials are still  limited 
by ordinary human intelligence, the conventional speed of spoken language,  reading 
motions of the eye and the emotional accompaniments of responsibility in a crisis.”  
(Schelling/Halperin 1961: 27)
During this brief time, humans have three de-escalation options:
 – Validation of the machine’s report or recommendation
 – Communication with the opponent to seek negotiations or explanations
 – Weighing up moral and legal implications
Arms control relies on these options by delaying the operational readiness of weapons systems. 
“Many weapons limitations seem to be oriented, implicitly if not explicitly, towards the pace of deci-
sion” (Schelling/Halperin 1961: 27). In conventional arms control this is achieved by making it illegal 
for missiles to be permanently ready to launch, requiring warheads to be stored separately from mis-
siles, or requiring submarines equipped with missiles to remain in coastal waters. In several cases 
during the Cold War, nuclear escalation was also prevented by people identifying a technical false 
alarm (Schlosser 2013). Arms control not only exploits this human factor but strengthens it through 
trust-building measures. These measures aim at confidence-building among people by, among other 
things, exchanging various types of information, allowing the presence of foreign observers at mili-
tary exercises, maintain exchange programs for officers and trainees, or hotlines for crisis situations 
(Goldblat 2002: 11).
If the autonomy of a weapons system is at a level that does not permit human monitoring and 
intervention, the automatic escalation of a situation becomes more likely. An example of an inci-
dent caused by AI is the flash crash on the New York Stock Exchange in May 2010, when market 
manipulation set off a downward spiral of sales by computer-controlled high-volume traders. As a 
result, officials set up safety measures (CFTC/SEC 2010). Autonomous weapons systems could be-
come involved in similar situations, where an error or chance causes exceptionally rapid escalation. 
A fallback mechanism to a human decision maker in the event of unexpected behavior by the AI 
would be a stabilizing precaution that would prevent a violent escalation (Scharre 2016: 38–39). Such 
a mechanism is also necessary so that confidence-building measures do not become redundant: 
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Trust that has been built up is less valuable if the weapons systems make their own decisions and 
human judgments of the opposing party no longer exert any influence.
But MLpAI in particular needs human monitoring as long as systematic learning errors and sus-
ceptibility to manipulation have not been eliminated (see Chapter 2.2). For example, if MLpAI has 
to distinguish between combatants and civilians, a faulty or manipulated learning model can lead 
to false classification. Enemy combatants could protect themselves by altering optical features on 
their clothing or weapons so that they are misclassified. MLpAI, the core of autonomous weapons 
systems, lacks the de-escalating human nature which could prevent such a scenario. The situation 
can be summed up in the words of Altmann and Sauer:
“Speed is undoubtedly a tactical advantage on the battlefield, and humans are slower than 
machines. But strategic stability is essential for survival. When it comes under threat, some 
remainder of human slowness is a good thing.” (Altmann/Sauer 2017: 136)
3.3.2  armS raCe InStabILIty and vertICaL proLIferatIon: the rISk 
of a revIved externaLLy-Led armament dynamIC
An interaction between the development of MLpAI and the armaments dynamics of a country can 
arise that can be guided both internally and externally. From the perspective of internally directed ar-
maments dynamics, the source of this interaction is power relationships within a society. AI research 
is part of a major technical phase in military development, most clearly visible in the US (Neuneck/
Alwardt 2008). Especially in democracies, rearmament is being promoted in order to develop the 
best weapons systems possible in order to minimize the risk of losses in warfare (Shaw, 2005: 79; 
Schörnig 2008). In addition, these states also have strong military-industrial actors, who use their 
domestic political influence to promote ongoing military development (Müller/Schörnig 2006: 106).
The perspective of externally directed armament dynamics sees their origin as lying in relation-
ships among two or more states. In one form, states are seen as striving for intensive military tech-
nological development in order to gain technological superiority over other states. On the basis of 
the Cold War nuclear arms race, Matthew Evangelista (1988) shows that the development of techno-
logical innovations in weapon systems took a very different course in the US and the USSR. While in 
the US innovations sprang from the strong civil society, in the USSR innovation was centralized and 
reactively specified by the state. Evangelista’s model is helpful in understanding current innovations 
in AI research: In keeping with the bottom-up approach, US research is largely funded by corporations 
in the private sector (Bughin et al 2017: 10). In Russia and China, on the other hand, governments are 
promoting development. As Vladimir Putin says:
“Artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all humankind, [...]. Whoever 
becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” (Lant 2017) 
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In addition, the Russian Military Industrial Committee announced that by 2025 it would replace 30 per-
cent of military technology with robotics and autonomous systems (Association of the United States 
Army 2017: 1). China also released plans promising US$150 billion over the next few years, in order 
to make China an innovation center for AI by 2030. As Chinese president Xi Jingping says:
“We need to speed up building China into a strong country with advanced manufacturing, 
pushing for deep integration between the real economy and advanced technologies includ-
ing the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence.” (Yu/Jing 2017)
The extraordinary progress of Chinese AI research is to be further expanded and the military is seek-
ing civilian cooperation to integrate AI into the armed forces (Kania 2017). The investment programs 
of Russia and China could reduce the US military and technological advantage.
If MLpAI-controlled weapons systems deliver a high strategic advantage comparable to nuclear 
weapons – even if of a different kind – and the government investments in military applications that 
have been announced are realized, a new arms race among at least the three actors China, Russia, 
and the USA could be initiated.
3.3.3 duaL-uSe and horIzontaL proLIferatIon: unControLLabLe dIStrIbutIon and uSe
Another aim of arms control is to curb the proliferation of weapons (systems) and military-technical 
knowledge. This objective is particularly threatened by the dual use8 problem, because advances in 
ongoing civilian development can be used for military purposes:
“[O]pen-sourcing the code for autonomous weapons seems undesirable, and we have not 
heard anybody calling for that to be done. But basic research in AI is typically not applica-
tion-specific in this way. Rather, to the extent that it succeeds, it will deliver algorithms and 
techniques that could be used in a very wide range of applications.” (Bostrom 2017: 137)
Even if the source codes of future (semi-) autonomous weapons systems are not publicly available, 
public basic research9 is not application-specific and could be exploited for illegal purposes. A vari-
ety of MLpAI applications and programming frameworks are freely available.10 These open source 
projects are used on the one hand to develop the defense industry and on the other hand in the 
development of civil projects. The more diverse the fields of application of a single piece of civilian 
MLpAI, the more likely is its use in weapons systems. In the case of nuclear weapons technology, the 
dissemination of knowledge was limited by the test stop norm, as the development of an advanced 
8   “The trade in dual-use items – goods, software and technology that can be used for both civilian and military appli-
cations and/or can contribute to the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) – is subject to controls to 
prevent the risks that these items may pose for international security.” (European Commission 2017)
9   A large number of well-known researchers publish their latest results (without source code) at https://arXiv.org. 
10   A selection of freely accessible learning architectures: Apache Singa, H2O, TensorFlow, Torch, Accord.NET.
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nuclear weapon requires several test runs. The tests must be performed on a scale that inevitably 
emits observable seismic waves, hydroacoustic signals or radionuclides. In the case of MLpAI, ban-
ning tests would not be effective, as small-scale functional tests or simulations – which do not emit 
detectable signals – can be performed and then scaled to many systems. The evolution of basic 
MLpAI into a weapon-ready application is a relatively small hurdle and makes arms control to prevent 
the spread of high-risk technology a distant goal.
4.  maChIne LearnIng-powered artIfICIaL InteLLIgenCe  
 In verIfICatIon meaSureS
“Trust, but verify” is an oft-quoted dictum in arms control, for an agreed-upon limitation of armaments 
does not liberate a state from the fundamental mistrust of other states. Only the verification – that is, 
the examination of whether states are complying with an arms control treaty – can reduce mistrust 
and strengthen the aspiration of every state to security.
The three objectives of verification are, firstly, to create transparency and thus to recognize trea-
ty breaches early, in order to initiate diplomatic, military or economic measures. Through the pros-
pect of these reactions, verification measures should discourage breaches of treaties. In addition to 
the deterrent function, these measures should secondly also build trust between parties. Confirming 
that all member states are respecting a treaty builds confidence in the value of arms control for the 
protection of national interests (Goldblat 2002: 309). Thirdly verification measures allow falsely ac-
cused states to demonstrate their compliance with a treaty. When such an allegation is formulated, 
evidence from verification and intelligence sources must be collected and evaluated. If the allegation 
proves to be true, Member States may adopt measures within the regime or refer the breach to the 
United Nations Security Council (Müller/Schörnig 2006: 150–153). Failure of diplomatic measures to 
correct breaches of a treaty may result in embargoes, sanctions or the threat of military force.
The potential measures make it clear that the validity and quality of the evidence collected is essen-
tial for the assessment. Off-site inspections (satellites, airplanes, radar and other sensor systems) 
and on-site inspections make it possible to monitor the armed forces, weapons or activities of the 
Member States. The inspections can be “conducted either in a systematic manner – continuously or 
periodically – or ad hoc, as decided by the verifying body, or upon challenge, as a result of a specific 
demand” (Goldblat 2002: 310). The verification process involves collecting, processing, and analyz-
ing data to derive actionable information. MLpAI can be used to increase validity and quality or im-
prove the efficiency of human analysts in one or all three of these steps.
4.1 APPLICATIONS AND TECHNICAL POTENTIAL
The potential of MLpAI to collect, process, and analyze data for verification is evident from applica-
tions or research already today. Various data sources are suitable as starting points for analyzing 
these cases: Satellite imagery from space, inspections on the ground, or global networks of sensors.
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4.1.1 from SpaCe: automated remote SenSIng wIth SateLLIte ImageS
For example, the analysis of satellite imagery plays an important role in arms control regimes for 
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and energy, or for the limitation of short- and medium-range 
missiles. The information obtained from satellite imagery – the process is also known as “remote 
sensing” – is used to verify treaty terms (Patton et al 2016, Niemeyer/Ruthowski 2016). To increase 
the validity and conclusiveness of these analyses, MLpAI can be used to identify objects and  changes 
over time on the images.
Intensive use is made of aerial photographs by, for example, the International Atomic Energy Or-
ganization (IAEO), which monitors maintenance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For monitor-
ing nuclear facilities, the IAEA uses the spatial, temporal and multispectral dimensions provided by 
satellite imagery. The aim of the analyses is to detect undeclared facilities for production of highly 
enriched uranium or plutonium, to track the use and processing of heavy metals, and to identify ob-
jects of interest for on-site inspections. For this, indicators such as temperature radiation or optical 
changes to buildings are used to monitor the expansion or the intensity of use of a facility (Truong et 
al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2014).
Fig. 2: A thermographic image of the Bruce nuclear power plant in Canada shows that unlike Block B, 
Block A is in operation. (Truong et al. 2005: 3) 
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One concrete challenge, for example, lies in the identification and monitoring of uranium mills, which 
produce the so-called yellow cake in the nuclear fuel cycle of natural uranium, a precursor of uranium 
used in nuclear power plants or nuclear weapons. Since these look very similar to completely harm-
less copper mills on satellite imagery, an AI developed by researchers uses characteristics of individ-
ual buildings and the size of the complex to classify the installations (Sundaresan et al. 2017). The AI 
carries out the classification using a human predefined decision tree. Although the IAEA has always 
adapted its actions to technological developments in the past, there is currently no evidence that it 
uses machine learning in the practical analysis of aerial photography.11 It will, however,  continue to be 
listed as undeveloped innovation in the updated 2018 research plan, but without high priority (Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency 2018: 15).
Commercial suppliers already offer usable applications: The geographic information system ENVI 
operates a module that allows researchers and analysts to load a sample image of an object that is 
being searched for, such as tanks for chemicals, as training data, and then have the program search 
for aerial photographs. In addition to application in urban planning, nature conservation and forestry, 
the manufacturer explicitly advertises the finding or locating of military vehicles, landing zones or 
buildings (Harris Cooperation 2017). Other suppliers12 have adopted the business model of AI-based 
evaluation of commercial satellite imagery. “We could not have done this five years ago,” says CEO 
Pavel Machalek of SpaceKnow (Dillow 2016). And the potential is still great, because advances in 
the combination of computing power, machine learning and satellite images are only just beginning.
Due to US restrictions, only relatively coarse-grained satellite images with a resolution of 30 to 
40 cm per pixel are available to non-state actors (Shalal 2014), whereas US spy satellites have a pre-
sumed resolution of 15 cm (Krebs 2017). Nevertheless, there are tremendous opportunities for MLpAI 
to use these images, because MLpAI is able to compensate any drawbacks resulting from poorer 
image resolution. Apart from small arms and light weapons, commercial machine learning can also 
identify large pieces of military equipment on low-resolution commercial satellite images.
Depending on the size of the object, MLpAI can also recognize unmistakable features and track 
an object across multiple images. Conspicuous changes to nuclear, chemical or biological factories 
can be analyzed automatically and anomalies communicated to the analysts of control regimes. This 
outstanding anomaly and pattern recognition feature can make the use of MLpAI in satellite-based 
verification more valid, thus strengthening it as an instrument.
11   Within the newly developed IAEA Geospatial Exploitation System, analysis tools from commercial providers should 
also be available (Balter 2014: 6). Machine learning could possibly be used there.
12   Satellite operator DigitalGlobe offers a programming framework for finding objects at: http://deepcore.io/. The 
SpaceKnow (https://spaceknow.com/), Orbital Insight (https://orbitalinsight.com/) and Descartes Labs (https://
www.descarteslabs.com/) start-ups offer online platforms for object and pattern recognition. A simplified function 
can be tried out on the sub-page https://search.descarteslabs.com/.
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4.1.2 on the ground: armS trade and CIvIL CLearanCe of unexpLoded expLoSIve devICeS
The trade in conventional weapons and thus among other things compliance with the Arms Trade 
Treaty could be monitored using MLpAI. The treaty obliges states to track arms exports to their 
destinations and to prevent potential transfers to states that commit human rights violations or 
 violations of international humanitarian law. In order to be able to guarantee this for transit goods 
too, the countless freight containers that are loaded, unloaded and reloaded daily in harbors must 
be checked (Holtom/Bromley 2011). Due to the huge volume of trade, human monitoring can at 
best involve sampling based on known risk factors such as origin, destination and declared content. 
But an MLpAI would be able to use X-rays to identify armaments within countless sealed containers, 
as a research team from University College London has already demonstrated (Jaccard et al. 2016). 
While humans would be able to interpret the images of contents created by the sensors, machine 
learning can capture the data much more quickly, recognize patterns in the data, and output a prob-
ability estimate of the type of content. In the training phase of the learning model, the MLpAI would 
have to be confronted with numerous different scenarios as well as the correct answer – e.g., “war-
head” or “no warhead.”
A second application example comes from humanitarian arms control: Anti-personnel mines and 
cluster munitions remain in the ground even after the conflict has ended, endangering the civilian 
population. The humanitarian arms control treaties, the Ottawa Convention and the Convention of 
Cluster Munitions, impose both a general prohibition and an obligation to remove weapons already 
in place on the parties to a conflict. This elaborate process requires trained teams which systemati-
cally pinpoint the areas involved, detect undetonated mines with metal detectors, and then detonate 
them in controlled explosions. Highly efficient methods have been and are being developed to meet 
the great challenge of finding the objects. A highly promising new approach combines ground radar 
with machine learning. As can be seen in the figure, radar images of an anti-personnel mine and of a 
flat beverage can are not easy to distinguish visually. To this end, various development teams trained 
an MLpAI using such input data (Núñez-Nieto et al. 2014; Seiffert et al. 2013). This method makes it 
possible to mount the system on an off-road vehicle and scan the ground a few meters in front of the 
car. The aim is to reduce the rate of accidents or false alarms compared with other tracking methods.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of sensor data for an anti-personnel mine and a beverage can (Sun/Li 2005: 3)
The two cases in this chapter have in common that the MLpAI receives immediate sensor data from 
the environment for identifying patterns. In the detection of armaments or anti-personnel landmin-
es, the interest lies in the distinction from other objects based on incomplete or unstructured data. 
Since these cases are actively being tested, implementation and application is likely to show that 
MLpAI is more efficient than legacy systems. If these developments are generalized and extrapolat-
ed, there is a considerable potential for material transparency: Activities or objects that violate arms 
control agreements can only be partially shielded against discovery, even with the utmost care. The 
small amount of unwanted information that penetrates the shielding can be interpreted by humans 
or statistical models either not at all or too slowly, but MLpAI can achieve a new level of transparency 
at this point.
4.1.3 a wIde range of SenSorS enabLeS “meaSurement and SIgnature InteLLIgenCe”
The processing of electro-optical, electromagnetic, acoustic and geophysical data as well as nuclear, 
biological and chemical trace elements is called measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) in 
intelligence work (Aid 2014: 120–122). The basic idea of MASINT is that the object being investigat-
ed consistently identifies a unique signature across different information carriers (radiation, sound, 
substances, etc.). The analysis of this information can be used for verification measures.
A control method that uses acoustic and seismic sensor data was developed by the Bochum Ver-
ification Project. The measuring instruments developed in the project were placed at intervals of up 
to 200m to provide a line of sensors that also detected vehicles off the roads. The measuring devices 
were able to classify passing military vehicles into different vehicle categories based on acoustic and 
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seismic signals (Hochmuth 2003). The more promising acoustic recognition was able to differentiate 
between five chain and wheeled vehicles at a time on the basis of engine noise (Altmann et al. 2002). 
The varying success rate of 69% to 98% could be stabilized at a high level through MLpAI and the re-
silience to disruptive noise, such as a rain shower, improved. For example, a line of such meters could 
control the quantitative characteristics of a particular vehicle type. By contrast, the identification of 
individual vehicles may prove difficult. Although the engine noise varies slightly depending on the 
vehicle, this can change due to wear or repairs, making recognition impossible.
In another promising area of application, MLpAI may well be used to verify compliance with the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT). The existing International Monitoring System (IMS) 
exemplifies conventional processing of an extremely high volume of sensor data. By capturing the 
data in a worldwide network of measurement stations, the IMS can diagnose nuclear explosions. 
Seismographs, hydroacoustic sensors, infrasonic sound stations and radionuclide detectors gener-
ate large amounts of data. Central data processing in Vienna analyzes and reduces the raw sensor 
data in order to distinguish signals from the constant noise and to classify them as either “nuclear 
explosion” or “not nuclear explosion” (Russell et al. 2010: 32). This process cannot yet be performed 
completely automatically. The analysts still have to laboriously rework the results of the automatic 
systems, since the automatic processing is prone to errors due to heavy noise, incorrect classifica-
tion or false associations. In order to further optimize the results, new methods were already pro-
posed by various project groups in 2009 at the International Scientific Studies (ISS) conference in 
Vienna. The project groups agreed unanimously on the problem: The data recorded by the sensors 
of the IMS is too complex for the performance of a conventional statistical analysis based on linear 
discrimination – a linear function that defines the boundary between groups. All four project groups 
are testing the ability of MLpAI to make non-linear discriminations. The project groups have already 
used classified data from the last ten years as “ground truth” (training set for the machine learning 
algorithm). The prototypes analyzed seismic data (Kleiner et al. 2009), hydroacoustic data (Tuma/
Igel 2009), infrasound data (Procopio et al. 2009), and radionuclide data (Stocki et al. 2010). All pro-
totypes were able to make the analysts’ task easier and make more accurate automated evaluations. 
Nevertheless, the researchers came to the conclusion that the systems are not yet operational and 
would need to be further refined. Overall, these research projects and improved further development 
(Arora et al. 2013) have demonstrated the high potential of MLpAI for verification in arms control 
based on the IMS data.
Analysis of large volumes of physical data – translated by sensors – can be greatly improved by 
MLpAI compared with human analysts. In particular, verification of the nuclear test ban will benefit 
tremendously from MLpAI in the short term, since the data is already structured by the sensors and 
is thus easier to analyze. MLpAI makes this type of verification much more attractive and could result 
in other weapons being monitored in a similar way. 
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4.2 CONCEPTUAL REFLECTION: IMPROVEMENTS IN EXISTING METHODS
The cases in the previous chapter show that MLpAI has the ability to strengthen arms control, espe-
cially its verification measures. Since the end of the East-West conflict, the significance of verification 
measures has stagnated due to new types of weapons technology and isolated breaches of the trea-
ty (Pilat 2002: 85–87). MLpAI would have the potential to make these measures more relevant once 
again, provided that states muster the appropriate political will to make an effort here.
The further technical development of verification measures, if implemented, would allow greater 
transparency in the monitoring of control items. The realization of improved verification would also 
strengthen the goal of deterring a secret breach of the treaty. The two other objectives of verification 
measures – building trust and demonstrating compliance with the treaty – could also benefit from 
increased transparency resulting from the use of MLpAI.
As shown in the previous chapters, the use of MLpAI has already been tested in feasibility studies 
and shown to be effective in verification measures. Nevertheless, machine learning algorithms are 
still facing major challenges. Depending on the form of the input data, they may need to “perceive” 
and interpret visual and other sensory impressions. They have to recognize patterns in digital data 
and complete an analysis using existing knowledge. Perception, pattern recognition, and generation 
of knowledge can be improved through machine learning because human constraints on the analy-
sis program cannot achieve the necessary complexity. The adaptability of machine learning allows 
programs to develop in parallel with the control objects when characteristics of the objects being 
analyzed change over time. MLpAI is able to distill knowledge from the highly complex and changing 
environment of verification actions, enhancing arms-related transparency. In addition, MLpAI allows 
greater scalability – a significant increase in the number of analyses performed. As Robert Cardillo, 
Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, states:
“If we were to attempt to manually exploit the commercial satellite imagery we 
 expect to have over the next 20 years, we would need eight million imagery analysts.”  
(Cardillo 2017)
At the same time, MLpAI offers other advantages over human analysts:
“Technology does have advantages over human inspectors. It can operate  continuously 
and at a constant level of observation. Its data is not comparable. It can be  limited to 
detecting treaty-relevant information, while ignoring other types of information.”  
(UNIDIR/VERTIC 2003: 27)
But whether MLpAI is to be used as an official verification tool in traditional arms control is a political 
decision member states must make. For political reasons, technical verification possibilities have 
already been artificially restricted:
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“The INF Treaty […] permitted an x-ray to be taken of missile canisters to determine the type 
of missile inside, but the machinery was set to a certain resolution so that sensitive design 
information could not be obtained.” (UNIDIR/VERTIC 2003: 27)
The technical measures in the Open Skies Treaty – a treaty aimed not at restricting weapons but 
at building trust – were deliberately limited to a low standard: During the overflights permitted by 
the treaty, aerial photographs with a maximum resolution of 30 centimeters are permitted, although 
commercial satellite images already provide the same or better resolution. In addition, in the process 
of modernization from analogue to digital cameras, care was taken not to exceed the maximum 
resolution specified in the treaty (Britting/Spitzer 2005). Technological advances in traditional arms 
control treaties are not in the best interest of those nations that already have a head start in intelli-
gence gathering. The use of MLpAI can – as has already happened with other traditional verification 
measures – be prevented or limited by political will or in the interest of military secrecy.
In humanitarian arms control, by contrast, development-inhibiting interests of nation states are 
unlikely to be expected. Pilot projects for the detection of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions 
(see Chapter 4.1.2) show the immense benefit of rapid clearance of such non-discriminatory weap-
ons. This principle could also be used by actors monitoring the international trade in small arms. 
For example, the itrace project tracks the distribution of such weapons through field investigations. 
Investigators could be supported by MLpAI, given that it can identify behavior patterns in data or un-
mistakable visual features, and thus link individual weapons to specific weapon inventories.
5.  maChIne LearnIng-powered artIfICIaL InteLLIgenCe IS part of 
the probLem and part of the SoLutIon
In this report, it became clear that in conventional weapons control, control of weapons of mass 
destruction and of modern weapons systems, MLpAI can be both part of the problem and part of 
the solution. As a control measure, by its very nature MLpAI eludes many approaches to imposing 
qualitative or quantitative limitations. Thus, it increases the relevance of alternative methods aimed 
at achieving overall military transparency or at confidence-building measures. It is precisely in these 
methods that MLpAI can again be used as a verifying instrument. Accurate and comprehensive infor-
mation processing allows MLpAI to create greater transparency, verify compliance with treaties, and 
reinforce trust between parties.
From the perspective of arms control theory, the use of MLpAI in weapon systems and verifica-
tion measures results in fragile strategic stability. Increased use of MLpAI in weapons systems can 
jeopardize strategic stability by minimizing the de-escalating human nature and promoting a techno-
logical arms race. The uncontrolled proliferation of basic MLpAI lowers the barriers of using MLpAI 
in weapons systems. Both these theoretical considerations and the realization that MLpAI will be 
the core element of future autonomous weapons systems are forcing limitations in technology by 
means of arms control. But qualitative or quantitative control on the basis of external appearance, ex-
ternally recognizable functions, or internal operating principles is not possible in the case of  MLpAI. 
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 Traditional approaches reach their limits at this point and the only remaining possibilities are to mon-
itor and restrict the MLpAI during development or deployment. If control of deployment through a 
“glass box” or preventive control of the development process is not enforceable, qualitative solutions 
could be sought at a higher level. Overall military capabilities and strategies could be presented more 
transparently and confidence-building measures intensified (Schörnig 2015).
Using MLpAI in verification measures can improve strategic stability, as it is to be expected that 
MLpAI will enable technical monitoring tools to provide information processing that is far more ac-
curate and comprehensive. However, this opportunity is not without obstacles: In the current state of 
development of machine learning, transparency and protection against external manipulation need 
to be improved, in order for it to be regarded as a valid verification method. These technical require-
ments must be met in order to build trust in the method and thus also between states. The potential 
of MLpAI as a verification method can be seen in numerous prototypes and early applications. These 
show that the ability of machine learning can be used in the analysis of optical, thermal and topo-
graphical satellite imagery, sensor data in on-site inspections, civilian arms flights, and unstructured 
data from a network of measuring stations.
Whether the two phenomena analyzed here will have a significant impact on arms control de-
pends on the environment in which the AI is to operate. Dividing the environment into types (Russell/
Norvig 2010: 46) shows that real-world actions must take into account far more unpredictable envi-
ronmental factors than are present in a digital environment. AI research still needs more years before 
it will be able to make it possible for weapons systems to take autonomous action in the real world. 
However, machine learning can already be used for verification, because the data to be analyzed is 
already available in digital form or can be interpreted according to a predetermined pattern, without 
having to be trained to deal with sudden changes in the environment. Timely deployment is critical, 
as MLpAI can already raise arms control to new levels of capacity before it is forced to face the new 
challenge of MLpAI-controlled weapons systems.
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Artificial intelligence (AI), especially AI driven by machine learning, is on 
everyone’s lips. Even in armaments such systems are playing an increas-
ingly important role: Some weapons systems are already able to identify 
targets independently and engage in combat with them. This poses prob-
lems for traditional forms of arms control originally designed to monitor 
physical objects such as mines and small arms and their internal function. 
In addition, important additional effects of reliable control such as confi-
dence-building and stabilization of diplomatic relations are not addressed. 
It is important for arms control to address such risks as well.
At the same time, the deployment of machine learning-powered artificial 
intelligence (MLpAI) as a tool offers tremendous potential for improving 
arms control processes. Here, more precise and comprehensive data pro-
cessing can engender more trust between states in particular. This tension 
between the risks and the opportunities connected with the use of MLpAI 
in arms control is highlighted in this report.
